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OBSCENITY
AN END TO WEIGHING?
GEoRGE D. HAimBA-uGE, JR.*
Inasmuch as the following book review also
possesses the qualities of an article, it is being
published as the latter.
THE END OF OBSCENITY: The Trials of Lady Chatterley,
Tropic of Cancer and Fanny Hill, by Charles Rembar (Random
House, 1968. Pp. 528. $8.95).
TROPIC OF CANCER ON TRIAL: A Case History of Censor-
ship, by E. R. Hutchison (Grove Press, 1968. Pp. 300. $6.50).
I AM CURIOUS (YELLOW): A Film by Vilgot Sjiman, Translated
from the Swedish by Martin Minow and Jenny Bohman (Grove
Press-An Evergreen Black Cat Book. Pp. 254. $1.75).
Two recent books-The End of Obscenity by Charles Rembar
and Tropic of Cancer on Trial by E. R. Hutchinson-trace the
recent judicial development of the constitutional rule that, in
the absence of pandering,1 the social interest in protection from
obscenity is outweighed by the slightest amount of any other
social value in the work in question and that therefore courts
are not to engage in weighing the two interests. The theme of
these two books may be said to derive from sometime Grove
Press counsel iRembar's decision not to follow precedent and
argue that because a book had literary quality it was not lustful.
Instead he "wanted to argue that because it had literary quality
* Associate Professor, University of South Carolina School of Law; A.B.,
DePauw University; J.D. Northwestern University; J.S.D. Yale University.
1. In Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966), the United States
Supreme Court held (Justices Black, Douglas, Harlan and Stewart dissenting)
that, "[w]here an exploitation of interests in titilation by pornography is
shown with respect to material lending itself to such exploitation through
pervasive treatment or description of sexual matters, such evidence may sup-
port the determination that the material is obscene even though in other
contexts the material would escape such condemnation." Mr. Justice Brennan
for the Court, 383 U.S. 463, 475-76 (1966). In Mishkin v. New York, 383
U.S. 502 (1966), the Court held per Brennan (Black, Douglas and Stewart
dissenting) that, "[w]here the material is designed for and primarily dis-
seminated to a clearly defined deviant sexual group, rather than the public
at large, the prurient appeal requirement of the Roth test is satisfied if the
dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to the prurient
interest in sex of the members of that group." 383 U.S. 502, 508 (1966). The
Ginzburg-Mishkin rationale has been characterized as a contextual standard
for obscenity by Professor John Semonche in Definitional and Contextual
Obscenity: The Supreme Court's New and Disturbing Accommodation, 13
U.C.L.A.L. REv. 1173 (1966); see Magrath, The Obscenity Cases: Grapes of
Roth, 1966 Sup. CT. REv. 7, 25-40.
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it should not be suppressed, and that it did not matter that it
was lustful."2 The litigation which followed the publication by
Grove of Henry Miller's Tropic of Cancer is covered extensively
by both books. Hutchison, an English professor and former
journalist, describes the campaign involving more than sixty
legal actions which were brought against those engaged in the
publication, distribution, importation or sale of the Miller book.
flembar describes not only the Tropic of Cancer cases, but simi-
lar litigations with respect to D. H. Lawrence's Lady Chatter-
ley's Lover and John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure
(Fanny Hill) from his vantage point as a participant in cases
involving all three books.
Both the Rembar and Hutchison books present a survey of the
law of obscenity in America before the recent cases of the late
fifties and sixties. Going as far back as the seventeenth century
licensing cases in England and the conviction of two Boston
book dealers for selling an illustrated edition of Fanny Hill in
1821, the authors make the point that there was no Anglo-Amer-
ican judicial definition of obscenity prior to the test stated in
the English case of Queen v. Hicklin.3 That test, which was used
subsequently by American courts in applying the Comstock Act
of 1873 and anti-obscenity laws of the states, was formulated
by the Lord Chief Justice Lord Cockburn as follows: "whether
the tendency of the matter charged as obscenity is to deprave
and corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral in-
fluences, and into whose hands a publication of this sort may
fall." It was not until 1957 that the United States Supreme
Court began paring down this broad standard. In Butler V.
Michigan,4 Justice Frankfurter wrote for a unanimous court
2. C. REMBAR, THE END OF OBSCENiTY 25-26 (1968).
3. 3 Q.B. 36D (1868). The court here applied one of Lord Campbell's Acts
(20 & 21 Vict. c. 83) in a case involving an anti-Catholic pamphlet entitled
The Confessional Unmasked: Showing the Depravity of the Romish Priest-
hood, the Iniquity of the Confessional, and the Questions Put to Females in
Confession. The Boston case [Commonwealth v. Holmes, 17 Mass. 366
(1921)], is regarded as the first recorded suppression of a literary work in
the United States on grounds of obscenity. See 383 U.S. 413, 425 (1966).
4. 352 U.S. 380 (1957). For an example of a statute defining obscenity on
the basis of its appeal to minors under 17 which the Supreme Court found
not to involve an invasion of such minors' constitutionally protected freedoms,
see New York Penal Law § 484-h as enacted by L. 1965, c. 327 or McKinney's
Consol. Laws, c. 40. The law is published as Appendix A to Mr. Justice
Brennan's opinion for the Court in Ginsberg v. New York [390 U.S. 629,
645-647 (1968)], a case in which the validity of the Act was upheld with
Justices Black, Douglas and Fortas dissenting.
For an example of an unconstitutional ordinance which provided for the
[Vol. 21
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that "quarantining the general reading public against books not
too rugged for grown men and women in order to shield juve-
nile innocence" is "to burn the house to roast the pig."5
That same year in affirming a federal and a state court con-
viction in Roth 'v. United States and Alberts 'v. California6 re-
spectively, the Supreme Court through Mr. Justice Brennan dis-
missed Hicklin, eschewed Clear and Present Danger,7 and
adopted this new test of obscenity: "whether to the average
person, applying contemporary community standards, the dom-
inant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to the
prurient interest."s  It was Rembar's refusal to accept this
"prurient interest" test of Roth-Alberts as the single test of
obscenity that formed the heart of the strategy he pursued in
defending Chatterley, Cancer and Memoirs. For Brennan had
also written in that same opinion that "implicit in the history of
the First Amendment is the rejection of obscenity as utterly
without redeeming social importance."9 Seizing upon this "ad-
classification of films according to whether or not they were "suitable for
young persons" under 16, see the Appendix to Mr. Justice Marshall's opinion
for the Court in Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas [390 U.S. 676, 691-
703 (1968)], a case in which the Dallas ordinance was struck down because of
the "absence of narrowly drawn, reasonable and definite standards for the offi-
cials to follow"--citing Niemnotke v. Maryland [340 U.S. 268 (1951)]. Mr.
Justice Harlan dissented because "the Court has demanded greater precision of
language from the City of Dallas than the Court can itself give, or even than
can sensibly be expected in this area of the law." He complained that the
Court's current approach to obscenity "has required us to spend an inordinant
amount of time in the absurd business of perusing and viewing the miserable
stuff that pours into the Court, mostly in state cases, all to no better end than
second-guessing state judges." Id. at 707, 709. Butler, Ginsberg and Inter-
state dealt, respectively, with a book entitled The Devil Rides Outside by
John Howard Griffin, "girlie magazines," and a motion picture entitled
Viva Maria; see Krislov, From Ginzburg to Ginsberg: The Unhurried Chil-
dren's Hour in Obscenity Litigation, 1968 Sup. CT. REv. 153; Comment, For
Adults Only: The Constitutionality of Governmental Film Censorship by Age
Classification, 69 YALF L.J. 141 (1959).
5. 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957). Mr. Justice Black concurred in the result
without opinion.
6. Roth v. United States, Alberts v. California, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). The
issues were so framed that the Court decided the validity of each statute
without passing on the merits of the attacked materials.
7. For a brief survey of the Clear and Present Danger Doctrine, see,
Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Atendinent, 72 YALE L. J.
877, 910-12 (1963).
8. 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957).
9. Id. at 484-85. Brennan based this statement on a passage from
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942):
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech,
the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to
raise any Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and ob-
scene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or "fighting" words
-those which by their very utterance inflict or tend to incite an
1969]
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ventitious aside" of Brennan's, Rembar fashioned his basic argu-
ment that, to quote from one of his briefs, "[tihe mark of
suppressible obscenity inheres in the constitutional justification
of the suppressive legislation." In other words, "[i]f there is
speech that may be suppressed only because it has no value, then
it is only speech wanting in value that may be suppressed."'
Lady Chatterley's Lover
This strategy was originated in 1959 when Grove Press pub-
lisher Barney Rosset"1 asked Rembar to defend Grove's unex-
purgated edition of Lady Chatterley's Lover. This story of an
affair between the wife of a partially paralyzed baronet and
his gamekeeper, Rembar says, "devoted more of its pages to the
act of sex and dealt with it in greater detail than anything ever
before sold over the counter [and] had language that had never
been seen in a book openly circulated, except when used for
tangential and occasional purposes."12  At that time, Rembar
writes, "[i]f there was great enough merit, and little enough
sex, the court might decide that the reader's reaction would be
intellectual or aesthetic, and not, as Father Gardiner"3 put it, a
'genital commotion'." 14 But the erotic passages were not "sub-
merged" in Ckatterley as they were found to be in Ulysses by
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. Writing for that court
immediate breach of the peace. It has been well observed that such
utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of
such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be
derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in
order and morality.
In this case the Court affirmed a conviction for addressing offensive, derisive,
or annoying words to a person lawfully in a public place.
10. C. REaBAR, supra note 2, at 55. Rembar points out that this opening was
not appreciated by leading commentators including Lockhart and McClure in
their article, Censorship of Obscenity: The Developing Constitutional Stan-
dards, 45 MINN. L. REv. 5 (1960). Brennan had cited in Roth-Alberts their
earlier article, Literature, The Law of Obscenity, and the Constitution, 38
MINN. L. REv. 295 (1954). The latter article is largely recapitulated in Ob-
scenity i; the Courts, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 587 (1955).
11. For a biographical sketch of Barney Rosset, see How to Publish 'Dirty
Books' for Fun and Profit, SATURDAY EVENING PosT, Jan. 25, 1969, at 33.
12. C. REmAR, supra note 2, at 55. For an account of the successful defense
in 1961 of the publishers of the unexpurgated edition of Lady Chatterley's
Lover in England, see C. RoLPH, THE TRIAL OF LADY CHAT'rERLEY: REGINA
V. PENGUIN BooKs LIrTrD. (1961). Those testifying for the defense included
Dame Rebecca West, E. M. Forster, Dilys Powell, C. Day Lewis, Stephen
Potter, and Norman St. John-Stevas. The latter is the author of the useful
OBSCENITY AND THE LAW (1956).
13. Harold C. Gardiner, S. J., editor of AmERICA and author of Moral Princi-
ples Towards A Definition of the Obscene, 20 LAW & CoNTmP. PROB. 560
(1955).
14. C. REMBAR, supra note 2, at 24.
[Vol. 21
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Judge Augustus Hand concluded-without violence to the
Hicklin test--that "[tlhe erotic passages are submerged in the
book as a whole and have little resultant effect."'u With regard
to Chatterley Rembar successfully persuaded the district and
appellate courts in the case of Grove Press, Ine. v. Christen-
berry16 that books which produce responses above the belt and
those which get you in the groin are not necessarily in mutually
exclusive categories. Rembar describes the significant develop-
ment at the district court level as follows:
[Judge] Bryan made something new of the "sub-
merge" test. With a deft sleight of hand, he turned it
around so fast one might think it was the same old test.
The court of appeals had said Ulysses was not obscene
because the rest of the book submerged the sex. Bryan
said Lady Chatterley's Lover was not obscene because
the sex failed to submerge the rest of the book: "Nor do
these passages and this language submerge the domi-
nant theme so as to make the book obscene even if they
could be considered and found to be obscene in isola-
tion.11
The district court judgment for the Grove Press was affirmed
by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in an opinion by Judge
Clark who, though unprepared to agree that any social value
would expiate obscenity, did decide that all the passages in
Chatterley to which the Postmaster General took exception were
"subordinate, but highly useful,' 8 elements to the development
15. United States v. One Book Entitled Ulysses, 72 F.2d 705, 707 (2d Cir.
1934).
The net effect even of portions most open to attack, such as the clos-
ing monologue of the wife of Leopold Bloom, is pitiful and tragic,
rather than lustful. The book depicts the souls of men and women
that are by turns bewildered and keenly apprehensive, sordid and
aspiring, ugly and beautiful, hateful and loving.... Indeed, it may be
questioned whether the obscene passages in Romeo and Juliet were as
necessary to the development of the play as those in the monologue
of Mrs. Bloom are to the depiction of the latter's tortured soul.
Judge A. Hand joined by his cousin Learned Hand (Judge Manton dis-
senting.) Id.
16. 276 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1960), aff'g, 175 F. Supp. 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
For description of work performed by the U. S. Post Office Department in
the control of obscenity, see E. ROBERTS, JR., THE SMUT RAxERs 60-71 (1966).
See also C. RnMBAR, supra note 2, at 114-17, 126-27.
17. C. Rembar, supra note 2, at 16; 175 F. Supp. 488, 500-01 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
18. The usefulness of Lawrence's novel was considered by Field & Stream's
book reviewer:
[T]his fictional account of the day-by-day life of an English game-
keeper is still of considerable interest to outdoor-minded readers, as it
contains many passages on pheasant raising, the apprehending of
19691
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In June 1961 the Grove Press published Tropic of Cancer
which had been excluded from the United States since its origi-
nal publication in France in 1934 by the Obelisk Press of Jack
Kahne who described it as "the most terrible, the most sordid,
the most magnificent manuscript that had ever fallen into my
hands."21 Hutchison writes that as Hemingway presented in
The Bun Also Rises the "high road of despair taken by the Lost
Generation in Paris" in the twenties, so Miller gave us the low
road trodden by the lice-ridden in that same time and place.
Miller saw his book as "a glob of spit in the face of Art, a kick
in the pants to God, [and] a bomb up the asshole of creation."
In Cancer, the courts found eighty-five sex episodes described
in "vulgar, vile, profane, and indecent words or language" on
112 pages. This frank treatment of sex, Hutchison contends is
pertinent to the book's theme-and the theme of all Miller's
work: the dehumanization of man for whose salvation Miller
prescribes self-realization. 22 To defend this book in court, Grove
chose as counsel Ephraim London who had successfully repre-
sented the distributors of the motion picture version of Lady
Chatterley's Lover before the United States Supreme Court in a
licensing case.23 London was replaced by Rembar in the fall as
poachers, ways to control vermin, and other chores and duties of the
professional gamekeeper. Unfortunately one is obliged to wade
through many pages of extraneous material in order to discover and
savor these sidelights on the management of a Midlands shooting
estate, and in this reviewer's opinion this book cannot take the place of
J. R. Miller's Practical Gamekeeper.
Zern, Book Review, FIELD & STRaAm, Nov. 1959, at 142.
19. 276 F.2d 433, 439 (2d Cir. 1960). "Actually," Judge Clark wrote, "the
book is a polemic against three things which Lawrence hated: the crass in-
dustrialization of the English Midlands, the British caste system, and inhibited
sex relations between man and woman. . . . The rationale he seeks to establish
is thus one surely arguable and open to a writer." Id. at 437-38.
20. C. REMBAR, supra note 2, at 149.
21. E. HUTCIsoN, TROPIC OF CANCER ON TRIAL 33 (1968).
22. Id. at 12-19.
23. Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the University of the
State of New York, 360 U.S. 684 (1959). Rembar found this decision of
"limited utility" in defending the book upon which the motion picture had
been based. "There was no contention that the film contained indecent scenes
or objectionable language." Rembar explained. C. REMBAR, supra note 2, at
145-46. It was decided in Kingsley-to quote Mr. Justice Stewart who spoke
for a unanimous Court-that New York could not "prevent the exhibition of
a motion picture because that picture advocates an idea-that adultery under
certain circumstances may be proper behavior." 360 U.S. 684, 688 (1959).
[Vol. 21
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a result of a dispute over legal strategy between London and
Grove publisher Rosset the nature of which is suggested by the
following excerpts from a letter of September 25, 1961 as
follows:
Dear Ephraim:
Unfortunately, a misunderstanding seems to have
arisen as to how the Miller case should be conducted.
Perhaps it would be a good idea if I briefly outlined
the Grove Press position.
The Supreme Court has now said that the protection
of the First Amendment extends to works that have
"the slightest redeeming social importance."
Under the law as it now stands, inquiries as to
whether a book is "erotic" or "lustful" or whether it
has a "tendency to corrupt" in this context were never
really meaningful-or in any case are no longer rele-
vant. The question is whether Henry Miller wrote as a
serious artist and produced in Tropic of Cancer a work
which has some literary merit.
Grove does not wish to be associated with any other
type of defense and especially does not want to be a
party to defending the book on the basis that it could
not excite anyone to lascivious thoughts or actions [the
Justice Department's feelings]. We will not hide behind
a hypocritical position, one which will not fail to react
unfavorably to us in the future.
I hope that you can see your way to representing our
position but if you cannot we should find another way
to proceed.
24
IRembar then prepared a general brief for the guidance of those
handling the details of the many pending Tropic of Cancer
cases. Citing the Roth-Alberts opinion and a series of per
curiam reversals, 25 Rembar ventured to argue that "[tlhe law
24. E. HuTcHISON, supra note 21, at 70.
25. The per curiam reversals which dealt with the motion pictures M
(Superior Films v. Department of Education, 346 U.S. 587 (1954)), La Ronde
(Commercial Pictures Corp. v. Regents of University, 346 U.S. 587 (1954)),
The Moon Is Blue (Holmby Production v. Vaughn, 350 U.S. 870 (1955)),
1969]
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at present is that the Constitution will not permit the applica-
tion of such [obscenity] statutes to works of literary value. It is
on this evidence that the Court must decide the matter. 2 6
On June 23, 1964, the United States Supreme Court filed a
per curiam opinion in the case of Grove Press, Inc. v. GersteinZ7
in which it summarily reversed a Florida appellate court deci-
sion which had upheld an injunction against the sale and distri-
bution there of Tropic of Cancer. It was an ironic victory for
Rembar, however, as the book had been "saved on a review that
had no briefs, no argument, and not even an opinion to call its
own .... The storm did not end with a great thunder and
lightning and a sequence of bright skies. It ended with a small
discordant noise, an echo of another case."26 To heighten the
irony, counsel for that other case---Jcobellia v. Ohio29-was
The Gane of Love (Times Film Corp. v. Chicago, 355 U.S. 35 (1957)) and
certain periodicals (Sunshine Book Co. v. Summerfield, 355 U.S. 372 (1958))
and One, Inc. v. Olesen, 355 U.S. 371 (1958) were widely interpreted to
mean that the prurient interest test was the equivalent of a "hard-core"
pornography test. See I EMERSON, HABER & DORSEN, POLITICAL AND CIVIL
RIGHITS IN TIE UNITED STATES 664-67 (1967); Haimbaugh, Film Censorship
Since Roth-Alberts, 51 Ky. L.J. 656, 659-62 (1963).
26. E. HUTCHISON, supra note 21, at 73-74.
27. 378 U.S. 577 (1964).
28. C. REMBAR, supra note 2, at 204-08.
29. 378 U.S. 184 (1964). The decision reversed the conviction of Nico
Jacobellis for possessing and exhibiting an obscene film at the Cleveland
Heights, Ohio, theater of which he was manager. Chief Justice Warren and
Justices Clark and Harlan dissented. Warren, writing for himself and Clark,
expressed the belief that "when the Court said in Roth that obscenity is to
be defined by reference to 'community standards,' it meant community stan-
dards-not a national standard, as is sometimes argued." Id. at 200. Harlan
reiterated his conviction "that in permitting States wide, but not federally
unrestricted scope in this field, while holding the Federal Government with a
tight rein, lies the best promise for achieving a sensible accommodation
between the public interest sought to be served by obscenity laws (cf. my
dissenting opinion in Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 77 ... .)
and protection of genuine rights of free expression." Id. at 203-04. The film
in question was a French import entitled Les Anmants or The Lovers. Mr.
Justice Brennan writing for himself and Mr. Justice Goldberg described The
Lovers as involving "a woman bored with her life and marriage who abandons
her husband and family for a young archaeologist with whom she has suddenly
fallen in love. There is an explicit love scene in the last reel of the film. .. ."
Id. at 95-96. Goldberg concurred in the Brennan opinion and added "that the
love scene deemed objectionable [by the state] is so fragmentary and fleeting
that only a censor's alert would make an audience conscious that something
'questionable' is being portrayed. Except for this rapid sequence the film
concerns itself with the history of an ill-matched and unhappy marriage.
I." d. at 197-98. A local film critic wrote:
I have read out-of-town reviews by the so-called cognoscenti and the
intelligentsia who have declared "The Lovers" to be screen poetry.
The verdict here: a dull picture until it turns to screen pornography,
and then it becomes nauseous. Suppose for the moment I condone its
pornographic sequences-which I do not -there are other entirely
(Vol. 21
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Ephraim London. In the Tropic of Cancer case, four members
of the Court were of the opinion that certiorari should have
been denied and the five voting for Grove did so for reasons
stated in Jacobellis which was decided the same day. The
Brennan opinion in the latter case, upon which Justices Brennan
and Goldberg based their stand in Cancer, contained the fol-
lowing statement:
Nor may the constitutional status of the material be
made to turn on a "weighing" of its social importance
against its prurient appeal, for a work cannot be pre-
scribed unless it is "utterly" without social im-
portance.30
It is interesting to note that Brennan did not rely directly upon
RotA-Alberts in stating this ban on weighing, but rather cited
Zeit'in v. A wnebergh,8 1 a decision of the California Supreme
Court which found for Tropic of Cancer on the basis of the
Rembar interpretation of the Brennan opinion in Roth-Alberts.
By now the box score indicated that Rembar had won to his
"social value or importance" theory all the members of the court
of last resort in California,3 2 a majority in Massachusetts,83 a
destructive moral issues which are almost as unacceptable, or will be
unacceptable to people who consider themselves decent folk.... Now
aside from the chamber scene which is at once disgusting and revolt-
ing, adultery is more than pardoned ....
W. Ward Marsh, Full Condemnation for 'The Lovers,' CLEVELAND PLAIN
DEALER, Nov. 13, 1959.
30. 378 U.S. 184, 191 (1964). The other three votes for Grove were cast by
speech absolutists Black and Douglas and by Mr. Justice Stewart who de-
scribed obscenity or pornography as an undefinable something which he
knows when he sees. Id. at 197. In a dissenting opinion in the Memoirs case,
Mr. Justice Clark points out that "[s]ignificantly no opinion in Jacobellis,
other than that of my Brother Brennan, mentioned the 'utterly without re-
deeming social importance' test which he there introduced into our many and
varied opinions in obscenity cases. Indeed, rather than recognize the 'utterly
without social importance' test," he continued, "[t]he Chief Justice in his dissent
in Jacobellis, which I joined, specifically" reiterated his acceptance of the
original Roth test. 383 U.S. 413, 443 (1966).
31. 59 Cal. 2d 901, 383 P.2d 152, 159 (1963). Justice Tobriner wrote: "Mr.
Justice Brennan, writing the majority opinion, held that 'obscenity is not
within the area of constitutionally protected speech or press' (354 U.S. p. 485,
77 S.Ct. p. 1309.) because, in the words that were later incorporated in the
California statute, obscenity is 'utterly without redeeming social importance.'
(354 U.S. p. 484, 77 S.Ct p. 1308.)"
32. See note 31 supra.
33. Attorney-General v. Book Named "Tropic of Cancer," 345 Mass. 11, 184
N.E.2d 328 (1962). Justice Cutter wrote for the court that "only predomin-
antly 'hard-core' pornography, without redeeming social significance, is ob-
scene in the constitutional sense."
1969]
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minority in New York 34 and two members of the Supreme
Court of the United States including the author of the majority
opinion in Roth-Alberts.
Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure
Rembar also describes in detail his defense in several states
of the concededly erotic Memoirs of A Woman of Pleasure fol-
lowing its publication by G. P. Putnam's Sons in 1963 more
than two centuries after its original publication in England. The
campaign to establish the "social importance" of Fanny Hill3 5
culminated successfully enough in 1966 when the United States
Supreme Court decided six to three in A Booke Named "John
Cleland's Memoirs of A Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney Gen-
eral of Massachusett~O that the book was not obscene. To three
members of the Court, "the considerable and impressive testi-
mony to the effect that this was a work of literary, historical
and social importance,"37 was controlling. To dissenting Justices
Clark, Harlan and White, this was not enough. A. study of
Memoirs led Clark "to think that it ha[d] no conceivable 'social
importance.' The author's obsession with sex," he continued,
34. People v. Fritch, 13 N.Y.2d 119, 243 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1963). Voting four
to three the New York Court of Appeals found that Tropic of Cancer was
not within the area of constitutional protection. judge Dye, in a dissenting
opinion in which he was joined by Judges Fuld and Van Voorhis, stated:
"Since 'Tropic' is a serious expression of views and reactions toward life,
however alien they may be to the reader's philosophy or experience, and since
the book is not without literary importance as attested by recognized critics
and scholars, the First Amendment does not permit its suppression." Judge
Dye cited Zeitlin v. Arnebergh, 59 Cal. 2d 901, 921-22, for an analysis and
critique of the book, Tropic of Cancer. Id., 243 N.Y.S.2d at 14.
35. Fanny Hill appeared differently to different Justices. To Mr. Justice
Clark, for example, "[s]he was nothing but a harlot-a sensationalist--ex-
ploiting her sexual attractions which she sold for fun, for money, for lodging
and keep, for an inheritance, and finally for a husband," 383 U.S. 413, 448
(1966) (dissenting opinion). Quoting the Reverend John R. Graham of
Denver, Mr. justice Douglas answered that "[a]t no time were her 'clients'
looked upon as means to an end. She tried and did understand them and she
was concerned about them as persons. When her lover, Charles, returned she
accepted herself as she was and was able to offer him her love and
devotion." 383 U.S. 413, 437 (1966) (concurring opinion). Clark acknowl-
edged that, "[i]t is true that Fanny's perverse experiences finally bring from
her the observation that 'the height of [sexual] enjoyment cannot be achieved
until true affection prepares the bed of passion.' But," he added, "this merely
emphasizes that sex, wherever and however found, remains the sole theme
of Memoirs. In my view, the book's repeated and unrelieved appeals to the
prurient interest of the average reader leave it utterly without redeeming
social importance." A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of
Pleasure" v. Attorney General of Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 450 (1966).
36. 383 U.S. 413 (1966). Rembar wrote: "Memoirs is, legally, a more vul-
nerable book than [Chatterley or Cancer]. Had it been the first to be tried,
the prospect would have been hopeless." C. REMBAR, supra note 2, at 222.
37. 383 U.S. 413, 425-26 (Douglas concurring).
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"his minute description of phalli, and his repetitious accounts
of bawdy sexual experiences and deviant sexual behavior indi-
cate the book was designed solely to appeal to the prurient
interest."3 8  As in Javobelli, there was no majority opinion.
Justice Goldberg had resigned since Jacobellis but his successor,
Mr. Justice Fortas, and the Chief Justice joined Mr. Justice
Brennan in an opinion in which the latter stated that under
the Roth-Alberts definition of obscenity
as elaborated in subsequent cases, three elements must
coalesce: it must be established that (a) the dominant
theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to the
prurient interest in sex; (b) the material is patently
offensive because it affronts contemporary community
standards relating to the description or representation
of sexual matters; and (c) the material is utterly with-
out redeeming social value.
3 9
Dissenting in Memoirs, Justice Clark strenuously objected to
Brennan's engrafting upon Roth-Alberts seven years after that
decision a new requirement that material may not be suppressed
unless it is "utterly without redeeming social value." To say
that this follows from the recognition in Roth that obscenity
is excluded from constitutional protection only because it is
"utterly without redeeming social importance," Clark wrote, is
a non sequitur. "My vote in that case-which was the deciding
one for the majority opinion," he explained,
was cast solely because .. . I understand [the Court's
test] to include only two constitutional requirements:
(1) the book must be judged as a whole, not by its
parts; and (2) it must be judged in terms of its appeal
to the prurient interest of the average person, applying
contemporary community standards. Indeed, obscenity
was denoted in Roth as having "such slight social value
as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived
... is clearly outweighed by the social interest in
order and morality.140
The same point was made by Mr. Justice White also dissent-
ing in Memoirs:
38. Id. at 454.
39. Id. at 419.
40. Id. at 441-43, 451. The italicized words which were quoted by Brennan
in Roth are from Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942).
See note 9 supra.
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To say that material within the Roth definition of ob-
scenity is nevertheless not obscene if it has some re-
deeming social value is to reject one of the basic
propositions of the Roth case-that such material is not
protected because it is inherently and utterly without
social value. . . Nor does it mean that if books like
Fanny Hill are unprotected, their nonprurient appeal is
necessarily lost to the world. Literary style, history,
teachings about sex, character description (even of a
prostitute) or moral lessons need not come wrapped in
such packages. The fact that they do impeaches their
claims to immunity from legislative censure.
41
Nevertheless, three members of the Court had agreed with
Rembar's contention that the absence of "social value" should
be an independent test of obscenity. 42 With speech absolutionist
Black43 (who regards that standard as about as uncertain as "the
unknown substance of the Milky Way") and Douglas"4 on the
Court, that was all one needed. The resignation of Mr. Justice
Fortas and the retirement of Chief Justice Warren in the spring
of 1969, however, cast doubt on the durability of the trivalent
obscenity standard formulated by Brennan in Memoirs.
41. Id. at 461. Compare with the following from Clark's dissenting opinion
in Memoirs: "If a book deals solely with erotic material in a manner calcu-
lated to appeal to the prurient interest, it matters not that it may be ex-
pressed in beautiful prose." Id. at 450.
42. The dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Stewart in Gihzburg might be in-
terpreted as indicating that he has accepted the lack of "social importance"
as an independent test of obscenity. 383 U.S. 463, 498-99.
43. Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 480 (1966). Mr. Justice Black
concurred in the reversal in Memoirs for reasons stated in his dissenting
opinion in Gin:burg which contained the following passages: "My conclu-
sion is that certainly after the fourteen separate opinions handed down in
these three cases [Gitzburg, Memoirs and Mishkin] today no person, not
even the most learned judge much less a layman, is capable of knowing in
advance of an ultimate decision of his particular case by this Court whether
certain material comes within the area of 'obscenity' as that term is con-
fused by the Court today . . . . I close this part of my dissent by saying
once again that I think the First Amendment forbids any kind or type or
nature of governmental censorship over views as distinguished from con-
duct." Id. at 480-81. Compare with the sentence with which Mr. Justice Clark
began his dissenting opinion in Memoirs: "The central development that
emerges from the aftermath of Roth v. United States . . . is that no stable
approach to the obscenity problem has yet been devised by this Court." 383
U.S. 413, 414 (1966).
44. Mr. Justice Douglas concluded his concurring opinion in Memoirs as
follows: "Whatever may be the reach of the power to regulate conduct, I
stand by my view in Roth v. United States . . . that the First Amendment
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Since Memoirs, it may be noted, the members of the Supreme
Court appear to have stuck to their positions in that case and in
Ginsberg which was decided at the same time. In Redrup v.
New York,45 two state convictions for selling or offering to sell
obscene literature and an injunction against the distribution
of such matter were reversed by the Supreme Court. The books
in question were two paperbacks entitled Lust Pool and Shane
Agent and the following magazines: High Heels, Spree, Gent,
Swank, Bachelor, Modern Man, Cavalcade, Gentleman, Ace
and Sir. The Court's opinion was per curiam but the footnotes
indicated that each member of the Court (except Justices Har-
lan and Clark who dissented on procedural grounds) held to the
standard he had espoused in Ginsberg and Memoirs. The con-
cluding paragraph of the brief opinion in Redrup states that
the reversal in each case was called for regardless of whether
the "social value" element is viewed as an independent factor
in the judgment of obscenity.46  A month after Redrup, the
Supreme Court reversed per curiam and without opinion nine
state and two federal obscenity convictions or injunctions with
Redrup cited by the majority of the Court as controlling author-
ity.47 Books involved in these cases included The Sex Life of a
Cop, Orgy Club, Sin Hooked, Bayou Sinners, Lust Hvngry,
Shame Shop, Fleshpot, Sinners Seance, Passion Priestess, Pent-
house Pagans, Shame Market, Sin. Warden and Flesh Avenger.
The recent case of Stanley v. Georgia,48 in which the Supreme
Court held that "the First and Fourteenth Amendments pro-
hibit making mere private possession of obscene material a
crime," is not relevant to the "social value" issue as the Court
there assumed for the purpose of the opinion that the films in
45. 386 U.S. 767 (1967).
46. In his dissenting opinion, Mr. Justice Harlan noted that the disposition
of the Redrup case did not reflect well on the processes of the Court since
the case had been "taken to consider the standards governing the application
of the scienter requirement announced in Smith v. California [361 U.S.
147, ... ] for obscenity prosecutions. There it was held," he added, "that
a defendant criminally charged with purveying obscene material must be
shown to have had some kind of knowledge of the character of such material:
the quality of that knowledge, however, was not defined." 386 U.S. 767, 771-
72 (1967). For description of work performed by the U. S. Bureau of Customs
in the control of obscenity, see E. ROBERTS, JR., THE SMUT RAxFRs 72-79
(1966).
47. 388 U.S. 440-54 (1967).
48. 89 S. Ct 1243 (1969). The films found at the home of the defendant in
the Stanley case were described by the State Supreme Court as "depicting
nude men and women engaged in acts of sexual intercourse and sodomy." 161
S.E2d 309, 310 (Ga. 1968).
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question were "obscene under any of the tests advanced by mem-
bers of this Court," citing Redrup apparently for its brief
descriptions of those various tests.49
Although alike in subject matter, the Rembar and Hutchison
books differ in tone. Rembar writes as a legal strategist; Hutch-
ison as a crusader. Indeed, Tropic of Cancer on TriaZ is a kind
of Yellow Submarine without pictures. The latter book like the
movie upon which it is based depicts in word and cartoon how
the Lord Mayor and his naval aid and a gallant crew of Beatles
accomplish the liberation of a paradise called Pepperland from
the Blue Meanies and their music-loathing mercenary allies the
Snapping Turtle Turks, the Hidden Persuaders, the Butterfly
Stompers, etc. Hutchison describes how Rosset and his lieuten-
49. Believing that another issue should have been taken up first, Justices
Stewart, Brennan and White preferred to rest their concurrence in the result
in Stanley on their finding that the films were seized in violation of the
fourth and fourteenth amendments and so were inadmissible in evidence
under the rule in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
Redrup was cited by Mr. Justice Stewart as the basis of his concurrence
in the Court's judgment in Teital Film Corporation v. Cusack [390 U.S. 139
(1968)], which reversed a permanent injunction by the Cook County
Illinois) Circuit Court against the showing of a film which it and the
local film censors had found to he obscene. Justices Black and Douglas felt
that reversal was required by either Redrup or Freedman v. Maryland, 380
U.S. 51 (1965). The majority stated, per curiam, that the Chicago motion
picture censorship procedure did not assure "a prompt final decision, to mini-
mize the deterrent effect of an interim and possibly erroneous denial of a
license" and therefore did not meet the standard which the Court had an-
nounced in Freedman. 390 U.S. 139, 141 (1968).
Redrup was also cited by Justices Stewart, Black and Douglas as the basis
of their concurrence in the Court's judgment in Lee Art Theatre, Inc. v.
Virginia [392 U.S. 636 (1968)] which reversed a conviction for possessing and
exhibiting lewd and obscene motion pictures. Citing Marcus v. Search War-
rants of Property at 105 East Tenth St., [367 U.S. 717 (1961)], the majority
stated that "[tJhe procedure under which the warrant issued solely upon the
conclusory assertions of the police officer without any inquiry by the justice
of the peace into the factual basis for the officer's conclusions was not a pro-
cedure 'designed to focus searchingly on the question of obscenity,' Id. at 732
., and therefore fell short of constitutional requirements demanding neces-
sary sensitivity to freedom of expression. See Freedman v. State of Maryland,
380 U.S. 51, 58-59 . . ." Id. at 637. Dissenting, Mr. Justice Harlan disting-
uished Lee Art Theatre from the Marcus case in which officers used a general
warrant to seize 11,000 copies of 280 publications most of which were later
found to be nonobscene. "Police officers may not be given carte blanche to
seize," Harlan wrote, "but they may certainly seize a specifically named
item on the probable cause, before the work 'taken as a whole' has been
adjudicated obscene. Any other rule would make adjudication ... quite
impossible. If the Court meant only that the officer should not merely say
that he has seen a movie and considers it obscene, but should offer something
in the way of a box score of what transpires therein, I consider it absurd
to think that a magistrate, armed with the luminous guidance this Court has
afforded, will be thus able to make a better judgment of probable obscenity."
Id. at 638. Body of a Female and Rent-a-girl were the films involved in the
Teitel Filn Corp. case.
[Vol. 21
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ant Rembar and a battery of lawyers defend a beleaguered
Grove of "erotic realism"50 from police, customs officials, cen-
sors, judges and the Milwaukee District Attorney who is the
Chief Blue Meanie of Hutchison's book. The epilogue of Yellow
Subnarine contains the following statement:
For every Pepperland you encounter-
You can also be sure there are Meanies in the vicinity.5'
A similar warning is found on the last page of Tropic of Cancer
on Trial:
Henry Miller's lament seems entirely justified. He
wrote me on October 20, 1964: "This battle with nega-
tive forces will go on perpetually."
52
I Am Curious Yellow
These predictions of future litigation were soon realized when
a Swedish film which Grove Press imported was seized by the
Bureau of Customs. 53 Grove has had little or no trouble, how-
ever, with the book, I Am Curious (Yellow), which contains the
complete scenario of the motion picture profusely illustrated
with still photographs from the film and sixty-five pages of
excerpts from the transcript of the trial. The contents of the
film-and scenario-is described in the opinion of federal dis-
trict court Judge Murphy in the case of United States v. A
Motion Picture Film Entitled "I Am Curious-Yellow":
These sexual scenes ranged from copulating in a tree;
copulating astride a balustrade of a public building and
in the nude in a room; with other scenes of buggery,
cunnilinction and fellatio, all in the nude. The final
scene, in conformity to the dominant theme, shows the
female lead performing an orchiechtomy or peotomy
[castration] or both on her murdered lover with a
kitchen carving knife.
54
50. Hutchison prefers the term "erotic realism" to "obscenity" or "pornog-
raphy" to describe "the frank and realistic treatment of sex in literature." The
term is borrowed from the book PORNOGRAPHY AND THE LAW by Phyllis and
Eberhard Kronhausen. E. HUTCHISON, supra note 21, at 12.
51. M. WILK, YELLOW SUBMARINE 119 (1968).
52. E. HUTCHISON, supra note 21, at 251. The book contains an additional 36
pages of notes, appendix and bibliography. It is strange that the latter does not
include Henry Miller's "Obscenity and the Law of Reflection," which is the
lead article in The Offense of Obscenity: A Symposium of Views, 51 KY. L.J.
577-710 (1963). D. H. Lawrence also expressed himself on the subject of
censorship. Eight of his essays, edited by Harry T. Moore were published in
1953 under the title, SEx, LITRATUmE AND CENSORSHIP.
53. The confiscation was pursuant to the Tariff Act of 1930, § 305, 19 U.S.C.
§ 1305 (1964).
54. 285 F. Supp. 465, 472 (1968). The name in full: United States of Amer-
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The published transcript contains statements by novelists
Norman Mailer and Stanley Kauffman, film critics Hollis
Alpert, Paul D. Zimmerman and John Simon, producer Andy
Warhol, and various sociologists, psychiatrists, and clergymen
who appeared to testify as to the interrelationships between the
sexual scenes and the political and moral themes. The defense
also called the Commissioner of Customs in New York and asked
him whether or not he weighed "the social values that you find
in a work against what you consider its prurient appeal in reach-
ing your judgment of whether or not to seize." He answered
that he did but that the ideas expounded in this film "conveyed
no real social import to me."5 ,5
Mailer, in his testimony, stated that he was bothered before he
saw the movie because everything in the history of movie-making
shows that it is moving to the point of showing sexual intercourse
on the screen. When he saw the film, however, he reported:
I felt it was one of the most important motion pictures
I have ever seen in my life because it attempted to deal
with the nature of modern reality, the extraordinary
complexity of modern reality.5 6
The exchange with the Reverend Howard Moody, Senior Min-
ister of the'Judson Memorial Church in New York City included,
for example, questions about the scene on the balcony of the
royal palace in Stockholm:
Q. In other words, the balcony or the balustrade scene
involves Lena and her boyfriend in expressing a
point of view about the authority of the government
or the palace?
A. Yes ....
THE COURT: What point of view were they expressing,
in your opinion?
THE WITNESS: Well, I would say that they were say-
ing in a sense, "Screw the Government."
57
"If the film has a message," Judge Murphy concluded,
"whether it is public poll taking on the social structure of the
Swedish society or the advocacy of non-violence or anti-Fran-
ica, Plaintiff, v. A Motion Picture Film Entitled "I Am Curious-Yellow"
("Jag Ar Nyfigen-Gul") (35 mm. Black and White, 6 Double Reels, 11,746 ft.
Swedish soundtrack with English subtitles) Grove Press, Inc., Claimant.
55. V. SJOUaN, I Am Cumous (YELwW) 226-27 (1968).
56. Id. at 245-46, 249.
57. Id. at 206.
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coism, I would suspect it is merely dross, providing a vehicle
for portraying sexual deviation and hard core pornography."58
The jury felt the same way. But in the Court of Appeals it
was decided that "obscenity vel non is not an issue of fact with
respect to which the Jury's finding has its usual conclusive
effect. It is rather," Judge Hays wrote in an opinion reversing
the trial court, "an issue of constitutional law that must event-
ually be decided by the court."59 He and a reluctant Judge
Friendly (who stated that he might well have joined Chief
Judge Lumbard in dissent "if the governing rule were still what
Mr. Justice Brennan stated in Roth v. United States"160 ) decided
that I Am Curious (Yellow) is not obscene. 61 They applied as
the test of obscenity the more recent rule stated by Brennan in
Memoirs (quoted above) which requires the coalescence of three
elements including the absence of any social value.
Today the central constitutional question concerning obscenity
can be stated as follows: Is the pornographic matter complained
of obscene because it is utterly without redeeming social import-
ance, or is it utterly without redeeming social importance
because it is obscene? For those who would attempt to under-
stand the current but possibly temporary ascendancy of the
former of these two interpretations of the rule in Roth and the
resultant prohibition of the weighing of social value against
pornography, The End of Obscenity, Tropic of Cancer on Trial
and, to a lesser extent, I Am Curious (Yellow) provide a valu-
able look behind the reported decisions.
58. 285 F. Supp. 465, 472 (1968). Compare with the dissenting opinion of
Chief Justice Lumbard of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals:
As my brother Hays says, 'It seems to be conceded that the sexual con-
tent of the film is presented with greater explictness than has been seen
in any other film produced for general viewing.' The sexual aspect of
the film does not arise from the plot, as that is non-existent; it arises
from a decision by the director, Vilgot Sj6man, to produce a film which
would shock the audience.
United States v. A Motion Piction Entitled "I Am Curious-Yellow," 404
F.2d 196, 203 (1968).
59. 404 F2d 196, 199 (1968). In his dissent, Chief Judge Lumbard stated,
"I see no good reason why that jury verdict should be disturbed. My colleagues
give no satisfactory explanation why jurors are not as qualified as they to pass
upon such questions." Id. at 203.
60. Id. at 200.
61. Id. at 199.
1969]
17
Haimbaugh: Obscenity an End to Weighing
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
